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Abstract 
In this paper, we advocate the idea that an adequate explanation of biological systems requires 
appealing to organisational closure as an emergent causal regime. We first develop a 
theoretical justification of emergence in terms of relatedness, by arguing that configurations, 
because of the relatedness among their constituents, possess ontologically irreducible 
properties, providing them with distinctive causal powers. We then focus on those emergent 
causal powers exerted as constraints, and we claim that biological systems crucially differ 
from other natural systems in that they realise a closure of constraints, i.e. a higher-level 
emergent regime of causation such that the constituents, each of them acting as a constraint, 
realise a mutual dependence among them, and are collectively able to self-maintain. Lastly, 
we claim that closure can be justifiably taken as an emergent regime of causation, without 
admitting that it inherently involves whole-parts causation, which would require committing 
to stronger ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Whether adequate explanations in biology require appealing to an emergent and distinctive 
causal regime seems to have an obvious positive answer, insofar as biological systems evolve 
by natural selection (Mayr, 2004, p. 31). Yet, as Wesley Salmon has pointed out (1998, p. 
324), one can distinguish between etiological explanations, which tell the story leading to the 
occurrence of a phenomenon, and constitutive explanations, which provide a causal analysis 
of the phenomenon itself. Accordingly, whereas it goes without saying for etiological 
explanations, there seems to be no obvious answer to the question of whether a constitutive 
explanation of biological systems would also appeal to a distinctive regime of causation, 
emergent from and irreducible to that at work in physical and chemical natural systems. 
During the last forty years, the idea that the constitutive organisation of biological systems 
does realise a distinctive regime of causation has been put forward by a number of pioneering 
authors like Rosen (1972, 1991), Piaget (1967), Maturana and Varela (1980), Varela et al. 
(1974), Varela (1979), Pattee (1972, 1973,), Ganti (1975, 2003) and recently developed in 
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various fields, including Theoretical Biology (Kauffman, 2000), Biochemistry (Luisi, 2006; 
Cornish-Bowden et al., 2007) and Systems Biology (Hofmeyr, 2007). Broadly speaking, the 
common background assumption of this scientific trend, despite the differences among the 
various formulations, consists in an understanding of biological systems which translates into 
scientific terms an idea originally exposed by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgement, 
according to which a biological system can be conceived as a natural purpose, such that:  
“The parts of it produce themselves together, one from the other, in their form as much 
as in their binding, reciprocally, and from this causation on, produce a whole. In such 
a product of nature each part, at the same time as it exists throughout all the others, is 
thought as existing with respect to the other parts and the whole, namely as instrument 
(organ). It is then - and for this sole reason - that such a product, as organized and 
organizing itself, can be called a natural purpose” (Kant, 1987, §65, p. 287).  
In this view1, then, biological systems realise a distinctive causal regime in which a set of 
constituents produce and maintain each other through a network of mutual interactions, such 
that the whole system can be said to be collectively able to self-produce and self-maintain. In 
the literature, this regime is usually referred to as closure (see also Mossio & Moreno, 2010, 
for a recent analysis)2
In spite of the increasing scientific and philosophical work on this notion, however, the status 
of closure as a distinctively biological causal regime has not yet been assessed, we hold, in 
adequate terms. Indeed, the very idea that closure would be ‘distinctive’ of the biological 
domain seems to require adopting a non-reductionist stance, according to which biological 
systems realise a regime of causation that is irreducible to those at work in other classes of 
natural (i.e. physical and chemical) systems. In this sense, hence, the philosophical discussion 
on closure is related to that on emergence, to the extent that closure can be ‘irreducibly 
biological’ only if biological systems can be shown to possess emergent causal powers. Still, 
existing accounts do not provide clear arguments supporting the claim that closure can be 
taken as an emergent causal regime.  
.  
Similarly, it is at present unclear whether or not closure involves inter-level causation. At first 
sight it seems obvious that closure inherently relies on the causal interplay between entities at 
different levels of description: the integrated activity of lower-level constituents contributes to 
generate the higher-level organisation, and the higher-level organisation plays a crucial role in 
maintaining and regenerating its own constituents, as well as controlling and regulating their 
behaviour and interactions. However, the appeal to inter-level causation in biological systems 
may oscillate between two different interpretations of the concept: on the one hand, the causal 
influence of an entity located at a given level of description on an external entity located at 
another (upper or lower) level of description; on the other hand, the causal influence of an 
entity, taken as a whole, on its own parts. As we will discuss, while it might seem quite 
obvious that closure involves inter-level causation in the first sense, a more difficult issue is 
whether this is also true for the second sense, which requires complying with more restrictive 
conceptual conditions.  
 
1 See also Weber & Varela (2002) for a discussion of the Kantian rooting of this scientific tradition.  
2 It is worth noting that this meaning of ‘closure’ has nothing to do with Kim’s one, which is at work in his 
argument about the “causal closure of the physical domain”. According to the latter, as Kim explains, “any 
physical event that has a cause at time t has a physical cause at t. This is the assumption that if we trace the 
causal ancestry of a physical event, we need never go outside the physical domain”(Kim, 1993: 280).  
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In this paper, we will advocate the view according to which an adequate constitutive 
explanation of biological systems requires appealing to the idea of organisational closure as 
an emergent regime of causation.  
Our argument will be twofold. On the one hand, we will develop a theoretical justification of 
emergent causation, by arguing that the idea of emergent causal powers can be consistently 
understood in terms of constraints. We will then suggest, by providing a general 
characterisation, that organisational closure should be conceptualised as a network of 
constraints mutually interacting in a distinctive way. On the other hand, we will maintain that 
although the mutual relations between constraints are such that the very existence of each of 
them depends on their being involved in the whole organisation, an emergent closed 
organisation does not necessarily imply inter-level causation, be it upward or downward, in 
the restrictive sense of a causal relation between the whole and its own parts. Yet, as we will 
suggest, the appeal to inter-level causation in this sense (which is the philosophically more 
interesting and discussed one) may possibly be relevant for organisational closure, if the 
adequate conceptual justification were provided.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss one of the main philosophical 
challenges to the idea of emergence – Kim’s exclusion argument – by focusing on the fact 
that it applies to a specific account of emergence formulated in terms of supervenience and 
irreducibility. In section 3, we recall the distinction between two dimensions of the debate 
about emergence - ontological irreducibility and epistemological non-derivability -, and 
clarify that a pertinent defence against the exclusion argument can be expressed, as we will 
do, exclusively in terms of irreducibility. Section 4 offers a conceptual justification of 
emergent properties, and argues that, because of the relatedness among their constituents, 
configurations possess ontologically irreducible properties, providing them with distinctive 
causal powers. In section 5, we focus on the specific case in which configurations exert 
distinctive causal powers as constraints acting on underlying physicochemical changes, and 
we provide a precise characterisation of their irreducible properties with respect to 
thermodynamic flow. Section 6 describes how constraints are distinctively at work in natural 
self-maintaining systems, and specifically in biological systems, in which they realise the 
causal regime labelled ‘closure’. In particular, we argue that closure can be taken as a higher-
level emergent configuration, ontologically irreducible and provided with distinctive causal 
powers, including the generation of functions. Section 7 concludes the analysis, and argues 
that closure can be justifiably taken as an emergent biological causal regime without 
admitting that it inherently involves inter-level causation. Yet, the connection between closure 
and inter-level causation remains an open issue requiring further philosophical and theoretical 
investigations.  
2. The philosophical challenge to emergence 
The very idea of some distinctively biological regime of causation cannot be justified unless it 
can be shown that, in some way, a given entity possesses characteristic properties by virtue of 
which it can exert emergent causal powers. A conceptual justification of emergence seems 
then to be a necessary requirement for a coherent account of biological causation.  
Philosophical work on emergence began during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries with the writings of the so-called “British Emergentists” (Mill, 1843; Alexander, 
1920; Lloyd Morgan, 1923; Broad, 1925), and has developed considerably over recent 
decades. As has often been underscored, a central contribution to this debate was made by 
Jaegwon Kim, who developed one of the most articulated conceptual challenges to the idea of 
emergence (Kim, 1993; 1997; 1998; 2006).  
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In a recent survey of these issues (Kim, 2006), Kim recalls what are, in his view, the two 
necessary ingredients of the idea of emergence, i.e. supervenience and irreducibility. 
Supervenience is a relation by virtue of which the emergent property of a whole is determined 
by the properties of, and relations between, its realisers. As he puts it (Kim, 2006, p. 550):  
“Supervenience: If property M emerges from properties N1, . . . Nn, then M supervenes 
on N1, . . . Nn. That is to say, systems that are alike in respect of basal conditions, N1, . 
. .  Nn must be alike in respect of their emergent properties”. 
In turn, irreducibility, and more precisely, according to Kim, functional irreducibility, is 
expressed as follows: 
“Irreducibility of emergents: Property M is emergent from a set of properties, N1, . . . 
Nn, only if M is not functionally reducible with the set of the Ns as its realizer” (Kim, 
2006, p. 555). 
Given the account of emergent properties in terms of supervenience and irreducibility, the 
central issue is whether these properties may possess distinctive causal powers. In his work, 
Kim has developed several lines of criticisms vis-à-vis emergence. The one, which is 
specifically relevant here, claims that emergent properties are exposed to the threat of 
epiphenomenalism. Kim’s argument on this matter is known as the “exclusion argument”, and 
it has been offered on several occasions. Very briefly, the idea is the following. If an 
emergent property M emerges from some basal conditions P, and M is said to cause some 
effect, one may ask “why cannot P displace M as a cause of any putative effect of M?” (Kim, 
2006, p. 558). If M is nomologically sufficient for whatever effect X, and P is nomologically 
sufficient for M (because of the supervenience relation), it seems to follow that P is 
nomologically sufficient for X, and M is “otiose and dispensable as a cause” of X. As a result, 
invoking the causal power of emergent structures would be useless, since epiphenomenal.  
The exclusion argument has crucial implications for the debate about emergence and 
reduction. If one admits (1) that the relation between M and P is correctly described in terms 
of supervenience and (2) the validity of what we will call here the principle of the inclusivity 
of levels3
First, explanation is exposed to the danger of causal drainage. Indeed, if the causal powers of 
an emergent entity can be reduced to the causal powers of its constituents, and if, as it may 
indeed be the case, there is no ‘rock-bottom’ level of reality, then it seems that “causal powers 
would drain away into a bottomless pit, and there would not be any causation anywhere” 
(Campbell and Bickhard, 2011, p. 14)
, i.e. “the idea that higher levels are based on certain complicated subsets from the 
lower levels and do not violate lower level laws” (Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 19), then two 
problematic consequences follow.  
4
 
3 We take here the notion of “inclusivity of levels” as analogous to Kim’s “Causal Inheritance Principle” (Kim, 
1993, p. 326), according to which if a property M is realised when its physical realisation bases P is instantiated, 
the causal powers of M are identical with the causal powers of P. By the choice of “inclusivity of levels” we 
want to emphasise the idea that in the natural world all causes are physical or are the result of the interaction 
between physical entities: no special causes (vitalist, spiritual, etc., that are not physically instantiated) are 
introduced at different levels, e.g. at the biological and the mental ones. It should be noted that Kim’s argument 
also requires the Causal Closure Principle as a premise, in the sense that the ultimate reduction of an emergent 
property to its fundamental realisation base is possible only if the basal level is causally closed (Kim, 2003). Yet, 
we maintain that the validity of the inclusivity of levels does not necessarily require appealing to causal closure: 
emergent causal powers can be reduced to basal powers even though the latter are not shown or supposed to be 
closed. Consequently, the argument we develop in this paper does not depend on the Causal Closure Principle. 
. Second, if there were some scientifically justifiable 
4 For Kim’s purposes, the exclusion argument is originally targeted at mental causation and is not supposed to 
imply causal drainage. As a matter of fact, Kim himself has vehemently tried to avoid causal drain drainage as 
the ultimate consequence of the argument of this argument in favour of reduction. In addition, on the basis of a 
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rock-bottom level of reality (which is a far from trivial assumption)5
In both cases, the very possibility of biological explanation is menaced. An adequate 
justification of a distinctive regime of biological causation should be provided in order to (1) 
avoid the danger of endless causal drainage and (2) make biological explanation theoretically 
independent from the physical and chemical ones, and directly related to the specificity of 
biological phenomenology instead of being derived from lower level explanations, and 
dependent on a single physical ‘theory of everything’ (Laughlin and Pines, 2000).  
, and causal drainage 
were blocked, the exclusion argument would force reductive physicalism (see Vicente, 2011 
for a recent analysis). In this second case, whatever appeal to distinctively biological causal 
relations (such as closure itself, and related notions such as ‘integration’, ‘control’, 
‘regulation’…) would at best constitute heuristic tools, unless it could be demonstrated that 
they can adequately be reduced to physical causation or, more generally, to any ‘more 
fundamental’ regime of causation.  
3. Irreducibility vs. non-derivability 
Before addressing the exclusion argument, let us make a preliminary conceptual distinction 
between two dimensions of the debate about emergence, i.e. irreducibility and non-
derivability.  
The exclusion argument challenges the status of emergent properties as causal agents of the 
world: how can a property be supervenient on something while being, at the same time, 
irreducible, and then possessing distinctive causal powers? An appropriate reply should then 
deal with the ontological issue of irreducibility, and justify emergent properties by showing 
that they are something ontologically ‘new’ with respect to their realisers. Irreducibility, 
hence, is inherently linked to ontological novelty. 
Irreducibility should not be confused with the possible non-derivability of emergent 
properties from the emergence base, which is an epistemological issue. Non-derivability 
refers to the fact that given a description of the properties of the realisers, it is not possible to 
predict, explain or deduce the emergent properties of the whole.  
As a matter of fact, most of the philosophical debate has tended to merge the two issues6, and 
to take both irreducibility and non-derivability as marks of emergence: emergent properties 
are not only irreducible but also, and crucially, non-derivable. Consider for instance the 
classical distinction between ‘resultant’ and ‘emergent’ properties, which is based precisely 
on criteria of non-derivability (or “non-deducibility”, in Kim, 2006, p. 552)7
                                                                                                                                                        
commitment to the Standard Model and its bottom level of fundamental physical particles, he rejects the 
arguments based on the possibility of the absence of a rock-bottom level of reality. For a detailed discussion of 
these issues see, for example Block’s criticism of Kim’s reduction argument (Block, 2003) and Kim’s reply 
(Kim, 2003). 
. Resultant 
properties are aggregative properties which the whole possesses at values that the parts do not 
(i.e. a kilogram of sand has a mass that none of its constituents has). Emergent properties, in 
5 The idea of a basic level with self-sufficient basic entities has been deeply questioned in microphysics, the very 
domain reductionist approaches appeal to as fundamental, where relational and heuristic accounts have taken 
place (Bitbol, 2007). 
6 The distinction has however been formulated, for instance by Silberstein and McGeever (1999), according to 
which epistemological emergence concerns models or formalisms, while ontological emergence involves 
irreducible causal capacities. Here, we follow this conventional distinction.  
7 Van Gulick (2001) refers to resultant and emergent properties as “specific value emergent” and “modest kind 
emergent” properties, respectively.  
 6 
turn, are properties of a kind that only the whole possesses, whereas the parts do not (i.e. a 
system can be alive, whereas none of its parts is alive). Although resultant properties can be 
said to be, in a general sense, irreducible to the properties of their realisers, however, they are 
not what British emergentists (and most contemporary authors) had in mind when speaking 
about emergence. In fact, when appealing to notions like ‘unpredictability’ or 
‘unexplainability’ as the mark of emergence, most authors are focusing on epistemological 
non-derivability8
Yet, we maintain that ontological irreducibility and epistemological non-derivability are 
logically distinct dimensions, and call for independent philosophical examinations. In what 
follows, we will discuss them separately, as two different issues.  
.  
On the one hand, we will develop throughout most of the paper a philosophical defence of 
emergence against the exclusion argument and the danger of epiphenomenalism, by relying 
exclusively on the irreducibility of emergent properties, without addressing the issue of their 
non-derivability. Emergent properties, we will argue, can be defined exclusively in terms of 
irreducibility and, crucially, they provide the system with distinctive causal powers even 
though they are derivable from their emergence base.  
On the other hand, the issue of the non-derivability of emergents may play an important role 
in the discussion on whether emerging properties enable a system to exert inter-level 
causation between the whole and the parts. As we will suggest in the last part of the paper 
(section 7.2), if an emergent property is proven to be also non-derivable from the properties of 
the constituents, because of the epistemological gap between them, it may be possible to 
interpret the relation between the whole and the parts as involving inter-level causation.  
4. Irreducibility and emergence 
The aim of this section is to offer, in response to the exclusion argument, a conceptual 
justification of emergent properties provided with irreducible and distinctive causal powers. 
The core of the argument consists in suggesting that a coherent account of emergent causal 
powers can be obtained by rejecting the identification between the ‘supervenience base’ and 
the ‘emergence base’ of a property. As we will propose, a property of a whole can be 
functionally reducible to the set of properties of its constituents (its supervenience base) while 
being functionally irreducible to, and then emergent on, various categories of entities which 
are distinct from that set. We will argue that, once the distinction between the supervenience 
and emergence base is conceded, the resulting account of emergence eludes the exclusion 
argument and justifies the existence of distinct regimes of causation, even by maintaining the 
principle of the inclusivity of levels.  
The argument will proceed in two steps. First, we will advocate (section 4.1) an interpretation 
of the relation between the whole and the parts in terms of relational mereological 
supervenience, according to which a supervenience relation holds between the whole and the 
configuration of its own constituents, and not the collection of constituents taken separately. 
We will then put forward a constitutive interpretation of relational supervenience, according 
to which supervenient properties can be in principle reduced to the configurational properties 
of the supervenience base. The main implication is that a supervenient property M and its 
 
8 Crutchfield, for instance, distinguished two different definitions and classes of models of emergence according 
to two different limitations in our capability “in principle” to describe emergent phenomena: nonpredictability 
and nondeducibility (Crutchfield, 1994).  
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basal properties S1,…Sn have identical causal powers. In the adoption of such a constitutive 
interpretation of relational supervenience lies the monistic stance of our perspective. 
Second, we suggest (section 4.2) that, even under the constitutive and monistic interpretation 
of relational mereological supervenience, a relation of emergence (as irreducibility) holds not 
between M and configurational properties but, instead, between configurational properties and 
the properties of different categories of entities which do not belong to the configuration. As a 
consequence, configurations can be justifiably said to possess irreducible and emergent 
properties and hence be able to exert non-epiphenomenal causal powers (in particular, as 
recalled in section 5, as constraints).  
4.1 Supervenience and constitution 
The logic of the exclusion argument is based on the way in which the relation between an 
emergent property M of the whole W and the set of basal properties N1, . . . Nn of its 
constituents P is conceived. Namely, the relation is supposed to be simultaneously one of 
(mereological) supervenience and functional irreducibility, while assuming at the same time, 
as mentioned above, the validity of the principle of inclusivity of levels.  
In Mind in a Physical World, Kim paved the way for an answer to the exclusion argument 
able to maintain the inclusivity of levels, by clarifying the terms of the supervenience relation, 
and particularly specifying how the supervenience base is to be conceived. Kim argues that 
emergent properties are micro-based macro properties, i.e. second order properties emerging 
out the first-order properties and relations of the basal constituents (Kim, 1998, pp. 85-86). 
The central idea is that the relevant supervenience base is not a set of properties of 
constituents taken individually or as a collection, but rather the properties of the configuration 
of constituents, i.e. the whole set of inherent and relational properties of the constituents. In 
other words, mereological supervenience should not be interpreted as atomistic but, rather, 
relational (see also Thompson, 2007, pp. 427-8)9
The move to adopt relational mereological supervenience makes configurations of 
constituents the relevant supervenience base. The basal properties S1…Sn that bring about a 
supervenient property M are not the properties of the collection of constituents taken 
separately, but rather the configurational properties of the constituents qua constituents 
(including their mutual relations, which alter their intrinsic properties as separate elements), 
which appear only when the configuration is actually realised. If the basal constituents 
actually and collectively constitute a global pattern or system W, then their properties would 
now include those generated by their being involved in specific relations and interactions with 
others elements.  
. 
The adoption of relational mereological supervenience has relevant implications for the 
question concerning the distinctive causal powers of the supervenient property with respect to 
 
9 The debate between a relational and an atomistic interpretation of the supervenience and emergence base has a 
long history that dates back to the first formulations of the notion of emergence in the British Emergentism. In 
Alexander’s framework, for example, space and time, the lower level on which the whole natural world emerge, 
are relational concepts, not definable separately (Alexander, 1920). The opposition between atomistic and 
relational approaches is particularly evident in Lloyd Morgan’s work. In contrast to the billiard balls model of 
extrinsic interactions, he presents the idea of relatedness based on inherent relations, that contribute to specify 
the properties of the terms involved in the relation (Lloyd Morgan, 1923, p. 19). It is also worth noting that 
according to some authors, Kim’s reference to relations is still made in a fundamentally atomistic framework, 
and does not imply a clear commitment to relational mereological supervenience, which implies the idea that 
relations “do not simply influence the parts, but supersede or subsume their independent existence in an 
irreducibly relational structure” (Thompson, 2007, p. 428).  
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its supervenience base. Indeed, the idea that emergent properties would be reducible to the 
properties of the constituents taken in isolation seems to be excessively committed to an 
atomistic view of nature, which does not take relations into account (Campbell and Bickhard, 
2011). In turn, the claim that a supervenient property M is in principle reducible to the set of 
configurational (i.e. including relations) properties S1,…Sn of its constituents is more 
convincing (again, by assuming the principle of inclusivity of levels), since configurations are 
far richer and more complex determinations than the mere collection of intrinsic properties of 
constituents. 
Accordingly, we hold that relational supervenience does not imply functional irreducibility 
but, on the contrary, constitution: M supervenes on S1,…Sn since it consists in S1,…Sn. A 
supervenient property M of a whole W corresponds to the whole set of configurational 
properties S1,…Sn of its constituents (its supervenience base B). The set of the (relevant) 
configurational properties of the constituents of the system is, at least in principle, equivalent 
to the supervenient property. Hence, if M can be functionally reduced to the set S1,…Sn of 
configurational properties of its constituents, it follows that it cannot possess distinctive 
causal powers10 since, in fact, they are equivalent11
Yet, as we will claim in the following section, a coherent account of emergent properties 
provided with distinctive causal powers can still be provided, even under the constitutive 
interpretation of whole-parts relations. 
.  
4.2 A reply to the exclusion argument 
Our reply to the exclusion argument consists in arguing that even though supervenient 
properties (M) have no distinctive causal powers with respect to the configurational properties 
S1,…Sn of the constituents, S1,…Sn themselves (which are equivalent to M, because of 
constitution) are irreducible properties which may generate distinctive causal powers. 
Accordingly, S1,…Sn can be said to be genuinely emergent. In other terms, there is an 
interpretation of emergence which is compatible with a monistic stance. 
Here is our argument. A given configuration C of elements of a whole W is identified by a set 
of (possibly dynamic) distinctive constitutive and relational properties S1,…Sn. On the basis of 
this set of distinctive properties, a configuration is functionally irreducible to whatever entity 
that does not actually12
 
10 The interpretation of relational mereological supervenience in terms of constitution is consistent, we argue, 
with the position developed by Craver and Bechtel (2007) within their mechanistic framework. As they suggest, 
the relations between constituents located at different levels in a mechanism are better understood as constitutive 
relations (pp. 554-555). See section 7 below for a detailed discussion.  
 possess the same set of properties. We claim that a relation of 
emergence holds between a configuration C and any emergence base P whenever C is 
irreducible to P, i.e. if C possesses some distinctive set of configurational properties that P 
does not possess, such that C does not supervene on P. The reader would immediately note 
that this characterisation of emergence is very general, and could in principle include a wide 
range of obvious and uninteresting cases of P, which would not be considered salient for the 
philosophical debate on emergence. This is correct, and we deal with this issue just below. 
Yet, let us point out here that, as Campbell and Bickhard (2011, p. 18; see also Teller, 1986) 
11 For simplicity, we will only refer, from now on, to ‘configurational properties S1,…Sn’ (equivalent to ‘property 
M’), and to ‘whole W’ (equivalent to ‘supervenience base B’ ). 
12 It is important to emphasise that configurational properties must be actually realised, and not just 
“dispositional”. As a consequence, a configuration C is functionally irreducible, in this account, also to those 
entities that would possess the “potential disposition” to actualise these properties.  
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have highlighted, appealing to configurations seems to be a sufficient answer to the danger of 
causal drain and epiphenomenalism. The crucial point, as we mentioned above, is that 
configurations include relational properties, which cannot be reduced to intrinsic properties, 
i.e. properties of constituents taken in isolation. Relatedness is ontological novelty. As a 
consequence, because of relatedness (again: actual relatedness) configurations may possess 
distinct causal powers that would not exist otherwise.  
To avoid confusion, it is important to stress again that this account, in contrast with most 
existing ones, defines emergence exclusively in terms of ontological irreducibility, by leaving 
aside the issue of the epistemological non-derivability of C from P. C is emergent on P if it 
possesses some set of new (relational) properties S1,…Sn which P does not possess, and which 
are then irreducible to the set of property N1,…Nn of P. A distinct issue, which is irrelevant 
here, is whether one can derive or predict S1,…Sn from N1,…Nn. In particular, S1,…Sn would 
be irreducible even if they were derivable, because of the novelty introduced by the relations 
among constituents.  
At this point, given the constitutive relation between the whole and the constituents advocated 
so far, one may wonder what exactly configurations emerge on. Following our definition, 
three main kinds of emergent base P can be logically identified. First, the configuration C is 
not supervenient, yet is emergent on the properties of any proper subset Psset of its constituents 
(its parts). A wheel has emergent properties and distinctive causal powers on any subset of 
itself (i.e., a half-wheel). Second, the configuration C is not supervenient, yet is emergent on 
its substrate Psstr, i.e. the collection of its constituents taken separately as if they were not 
constituents (so to speak, the ‘potential ingredients’ of a configuration). A wheel is emergent 
on the collection of molecules taken as if they were not actually assembled as a wheel.  
Third, and importantly, the configuration C is not supervenient, yet is emergent on its 
surroundings Psurr, i.e. each set of external elements that does not actually constitute C. The 
wheel is emergent on each set of external molecules or entities, which are not actual 
constituents of it. In particular, given that a very broad set of entities might be included in 
Psurr, only relevant instances will actually be considered: in particular, the reference to 
surroundings Psurr will be restricted to those relevant Psurr on which the configuration C has 
causal effects, by virtue of its emerging properties. As we will discuss in the following 
section, this is precisely the relevant case with regard to biological systems.  
At this point, we have all the elements required to formulate our reply to the exclusion 
argument. The argument claims that properties cannot be emergent unless it can be shown 
that they possess distinctive causal powers; at the same time, it seems that, as supervenient 
properties, they do not possess new causal powers with respect to their supervenience base. 
Hence, they are epiphenomenal. To this, we reply that emergent properties do not need to be 
irreducible to their supervenience base to possess distinctive causal powers: what matters is 
that configurations, because of relatedness, possess irreducible properties with respect to their 
subsets, substrate and (relevant) surroundings. Supervenience and emergence are then 
alternative notions: either a set of properties is supervenient on another one (in which case 
there is a constitutive relation between them), or it is emergent (in which case there is 
irreducibility).  
Let us stress again that this way of conceiving emergence, interpreted exclusively as 
ontological irreducibility, is indeed very general. For instance, all chemical bonds are 
configurations emergent on their parts, substrate and surroundings, since they realise new 
relations, and therefore possess distinctive configurational properties. Yet, the fact that this 
definition covers also irrelevant or obvious cases is, we argue, the price to pay for making it 
compatible with the constitutive interpretation of the relations between the whole and the 
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parts. More generally, we hold that this characterisation of emergence is sufficient to provide 
a justification for the appeal to distinctive and irreducible causal powers in the scientific 
discourse (Laughlin et al., 2000), and specifically in biology. Emergence appears whenever 
scientists are dealing with a system, as biological ones, whose properties are irreducible to 
those of its isolated parts, substrate and surroundings. In such cases, one must introduce new 
objects, relations and causal powers, which exist only within that very system, and not in its 
emergent base13
5 Emerging causal powers as constraints 
.  
By virtue of their relatedness, configurations possess emergent properties, and may exert 
distinctive causal powers on their surroundings that can take different forms, following the 
kind of systems under consideration. Let us focus here on the case in which these causal 
powers are exerted as constraints, which can be organised in turn as closure.  
In general terms, constraints are determinations that reduce the degrees of freedom of the 
system to which they belong (i.e. an inclined plane which reduces to two spatial dimensions 
the motion of a ball on it), simplify (or change) the description of that system, and contribute 
to provide an adequate explanation of its behaviour, which might otherwise be under-
determined or wrongly determined (Umerez & Mossio, 2013).  
In a given system, constraints are characterised as configurations emerging on, and acting on, 
specific surroundings Psurr, i.e. a set of physicochemical changes that involve the movement, 
alteration, consumption, and/or production of entities in conditions away from 
thermodynamic equilibrium. More precisely, given a particular process Psurr, a configuration 
C acts as a constraint if the following conditions are fulfilled: 
1) At a time scale τi, C is conserved throughout Psurr, i.e. there is a set of emerging 
properties S1,…Sn of C which remain unaffected throughout Psurr;  
2) At τi, C exerts a causal role on Psurr, i.e. there is some observable difference between 
Psurr and Psurrc (Psurrc is Psurr under the causal influence of C by virtue of properties 
S1,…Sn). 
It is worth noting that, usually, C does not extend the set of possible behaviours of Psurr, i.e. 
Psurr could in principle (although very unlikely) exhibit, at different time scales, the behaviour 
of Psurrc without the action of C.  
Consider the example of the vascular system, taken as a global constraint (C) on the flow of 
oxygen (Psurr) in an organism. First, the topology of the vascular system remains unaltered 
during the oxygen flow (at least at relatively short scales τi). Second, the vascular system 
exerts a causal role on the flow of oxygen, since, for instance, the flow takes the form of a 
transport (canalised) to the neighbourhood of each cell, instead of having a diffusive 
(unconstrained) form. In this case, moreover, the flow of oxygen could reach (at least in 
principle, since in practice this would be extremely unlikely) each cell at an adequate rate 
even in the absence of the vascular system, from the point of view of statistical mechanics.  
For the purposes of this paper, two features of the concept of constraint have to be 
emphasised.  
 
13 It is worth noting that the relation between the emergent properties and its emergence base can be interpreted 
both synchronically and diachronically. Being based on novelty, in fact, the irreducibility to any entity that does 
not belong to an actual configuration is in principle compatible with both the dimensions of emergence. See also 
footnote 21 below.  
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First, insofar as they are causal effects produced by emerging properties of configurations, 
constraints depend on the existence of the relevant configuration. Hence, constraints are not 
universal, but rather local and contingent causes. In particular, configurations fit the definition 
only at some specific time scales, whereas at different scales they usually fail to satisfy one or 
more conditions. For instance, at time scales larger than τi, configurations are normally 
subject to degradation, and must be replaced or repaired (and then fail fitting condition 2). 
Yet, at τi, constraints are irreducible to the thermodynamic flow (in particular because of their 
conservation) and require an alternative description (Pattee, 1972). Because of their 
distinctive causal powers, which cannot be reduced to those of their emergent base P, 
constraints constitute an emergent regime of causation, operating in addition to 
physicochemical changes.  
Second, in the description of physical systems, constraints are in most cases introduced as 
external determinations (boundary conditions, parameters…), such that they exert some 
causal influence on Psurr, while their existence (or, more precisely: the maintenance of the 
specific properties S1,…Sn providing them with relevant causal powers) does not depend on 
Psurr. For instance, the inclined plane constrains the dynamics of the ball, but the constrained 
dynamics do not have a causal role on the existence or maintenance of the plane. 
The appeal to constraints to provide adequate descriptions and explanations is ubiquitous in 
natural sciences. In the biological domain, however, constraints play a characteristic role to 
the extent that they give rise to a specific causal regime of self-maintenance, that we label 
closure. 
6 Self-maintenance: from self-organisation to closure 
In many natural systems, the relation between a constraint C and its emergent base Psurr is 
oriented, in the sense that C may causally act on Psurr, but not vice-versa. Yet, there are cases 
in which C acts on Psurr that, once constrained, contributes to determine (at least some of) the 
boundary conditions at which C exists. To use our labels, there are cases in which C 
constrains Psurr such that the constrained Psurrc constitute some of the boundary conditions 
required for C to exist. In that case, the resulting system realises self-maintenance, since C 
constrains Psurr, which in turn, once constrained, maintains C. If C did not act on Psurr, it would 
not (or it would cease to) exist. Self-maintaining systems are then systems able to maintain 
some of the conditions required for their own existence, by virtue of the constraining action of 
their own configurations (Mossio & Moreno, 2010, p. 272; see also Kauffman, 2000, for a 
related analysis in terms of ‘work-constraint cycles’). 
Self-maintenance exists in the physical and chemical domain. The classical example are 
dissipative structures (Glansdorff & Prigogine, 1971; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977), in which a 
huge number of microscopic elements adopt a global, macroscopic ordered configuration (a 
‘structure’) in the presence of a specific flow of energy and matter in far-from-
thermodynamic equilibrium (FFE) conditions. In turn, the macroscopic configuration exerts a 
constraint that contributes to the maintenance of the FFE flow of energy and matter enabling 
the persistence of the microscopic dynamics (Ruiz-Mirazo, 2001, p. 59).  
A number of physical and chemical systems, such as Bénard cells, flames, hurricanes, and 
oscillatory chemical reactions, can be pertinently described as self-maintaining dissipative 
systems. Let’s take the example of ‘Bénard cells’, i.e. macroscopic structures that appear 
spontaneously in a liquid when heat is applied from below (Chandrasekhar, 1961). In the 
initial situation, in which there is no difference in temperature between upper and lower 
layers, the liquid appears uniform, in terms of the statistical distribution of the kinetic energy 
 12 
of the molecules. When heat is applied, and the temperature in the lower layer is increased up 
to a specific threshold, the liquid’s dynamics change dramatically: the random movements of 
the microscopic molecules spontaneously become ordered, creating a macroscopic pattern 
(convection cells). In each cell, billions of microscopic molecules rotate in a coherent manner 
along a hexagonal path, either clockwise or anticlockwise, and always in the opposite 
direction from that of its immediate neighbours in a horizontal plane.  
Bénard cells appear when Psurr realises some specific boundary conditions (e.g. the heat 
applied from below), which exert external constraints on the dynamics. Yet, once they have 
appeared, the maintenance of Bénard cells depends not only on those independent boundary 
conditions, but also on some constraint exerted by the very configuration on its surroundings. 
For instance, the cells capture surrounding water molecules in their dynamics, turning them 
into constituents. It is through this action that Bénard cells contribute to maintain some of the 
boundary condition at which the flow of energy and matter traversing them may occur. With 
our labels, the emerging configuration C acts as a constraint on Psurr, on which it emerges, by 
turning them into appropriate boundary conditions Psurrc. We need then to appeal to C itself to 
explain its own maintenance, which would otherwise be impossible (or at least very unlikely) 
on the basis of the unconstrained properties of Psurr. 
As it has been recently emphasised (Mossio & Moreno, 2010), dissipative systems realise a 
minimal form of self-maintenance, in the sense that they generate a single macroscopic 
structure acting as a constraint on its surroundings. Accordingly, dissipative systems make a 
unique contribution to their own maintenance, since they contribute to maintain the unique 
constraint involved in the self-maintaining loop between C and Psurr.  
When considering biological systems, the situation is more complex. Unlike minimal self-
maintaining systems, biological systems generate a network of structures, exerting mutual 
constraining actions on their boundary conditions, such that the whole organisation of 
constraints realises collective self-maintenance. In biological systems, constraints are not able 
to achieve self-maintenance individually or locally: each of them exists insofar as it 
contributes to maintain the whole organisation of constraints that, in turn, maintains (at least 
some of) its own boundary conditions. Such mutual dependence between a set of constraints 
is what we call closure, the causal regime that, we claim, is paradigmatically at work in 
biological systems14
Let’s give a more formal characterisation. A system realises closure if and only if it contains a 
set of structures C1…Cn acting as constraints at the relevant time scales τ1… τn, by virtue of 
emerging properties S1,…Sn such that, for each constraint Ci, (at least some of) the boundary 
conditions required for the maintenance of the relevant emergent property Mi are determined 
by the causal action of another constraint Cj by virtue of a property Mj, whose maintenance 
depends in turn on the action of Ci. 
.  
As all dissipative systems, be they physical or chemical, biological systems are traversed by a 
flow of energy and matter, which takes the form of processes and reactions occurring in open 
thermodynamic conditions. What specifically characterises biological systems15
 
14 The concept of closure has been proposed by several influential authors, that we have mentioned in the 
introduction. For a recent survey, see Chandler & Van De Vijver (2000). Mossio (2013) provides a synthetic 
overview of the meaning and uses of the term in the biological domain.  
 is the fact 
that the thermodynamic flow is constrained and canalised by a set of constraints in such a way 
that they realise a mutual dependence. In this sense, biological organisation is a specific kind 
15 Or, at least, systems being ‘at the edge’ of the biological domain. We do not discuss this issue here, since it 
does not interfere with the central point.  
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of higher-level configuration, which achieves self-determination as collective self-
constriction: the conditions of existence of (at least a subset of) the constitutive constraints 
are, because of closure, mutually determined within the very organisation. In what follows, 
the term ‘organisation’ will then specifically refer to this kind of higher-level configurations, 
whose constituents are themselves configurations, each of them acting as constraints. 
This characterisation is, of course, very general and lacks several specifications about the way 
in which closure is actually realised in biological systems. Yet, it is precise enough for the 
purposes of this paper, and in particular, allows discussing three crucial implications. 
First, the closed regime of dependence among constraints is emergent on, and irreducible to, 
the open regime of thermodynamic processes and changes. Closure is realised through the 
mutual causal action of the constraints which, as discussed in section 5, are irreducible to the 
thermodynamic flow, each constraint being conserved at the relevant time scale τ1… τn. As a 
consequence, a reductive description of closure in terms of the causal regime of 
thermodynamic changes would be inadequate, since it would be unable to include constraints 
and their contribution as causal factors16. In particular, a description of biological organisation 
not appealing to the causal power of constraints and their closure would amount to a system 
constituted by a cluster of unconnected processes and reactions, whose coordinated 
occurrence could be theoretically possible at very large time scales (see the definition of 
constraints above), but extremely unlikely – and often impossible – at biologically relevant 
time scales17
Second, organisations themselves possess, because of closure, emergent properties. One of 
them, which is particularly relevant here, is the generation of functions. As it has been 
recently argued (Mossio et al., 2009; Saborido et al., 2011), when subject to closure, 
constraints correspond to biological functions: performing a function, in this view, is 
equivalent to exerting a constraining action on an underlying process or reaction
.  
18
Third, closure is specifically defined with respect to the emergence base Psurr constituted by a 
set of processes and changes occurring in conditions far from thermodynamic equilibrium. 
. All kinds 
of biological structures and traits to which functions can be ascribed satisfy the above 
definition of constraint, although at very different temporal and spatial scales. Some intuitive 
examples, in addition to the vascular system mentioned above, include, at different scales: 
enzymes (which constrain reactions), membrane pumps and channels (which constrain the 
flow of ions through the membrane), organs (as the heart which constrains the flow of blood), 
and so on. The emergence of closure is then the emergence of functionality within biological 
organisation: constraints do not exert functions when taken in isolation, but only insofar as 
they are subject to a closed emergent organisation. 
 
16 It is of course conceivable that a description of constraints might possibly be given in terms of 
thermodynamics, specifically as entities not being affected by the thermodynamic flow. However, in this case, 
constraints (and then closure) would not be reduced to a different causal regime, but simply redescribed in 
different terms.  
17 This allows distinguishing, moreover, a closure of constraints from a cycle of processes or reactions as, for 
instance, the water cycle. In the case of cycles, the entities and processes involved in the cycle (e.g. clouds, rain, 
spring, river, sea, clouds…) do not act as constraints on each other, and the system can be adequately described 
by appealing to a set of external boundary conditions (ground, sun…) acting on a single causal regime of 
thermodynamic changes (see also Mossio & Moreno, 2010).  
18 In this framework, functions are interpreted in an organisational sense: a trait is functional if and only if it 
exerts a constraint that is subject to closure and, consequently, contributes to the maintenance of the organisation 
while being maintained by that very organisation. As extensively discussed in Mossio et al. (2009) the 
organisational account of functions integrates in a unified framework both etiological and causal-systemic 
theories of function.  
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Although mutually irreducible, the two causal regimes realise a two-way interaction in 
biological systems, to the extent that constraints act on thermodynamic processes and 
changes, which in turn contribute to reproducing or maintaining these constraints. Hence, it 
might be tempting to conclude that closure (just as any form of self-maintenance) inherently 
involves not just emergent causation but also inter-level causation, at work between the two 
causal regimes. Yet, there are several reasons to resist the temptation, at least insofar as 
particularly controversial kinds of inter-level causation are invoked. 
7 Inter-level causation 
The issue of inter-level (be it upward or downward) causation has been, more or less 
explicitly, a central aspect of the debate about emergence since its beginnings19
In Kim’s account, attributing causal powers to emergent properties necessarily implies 
downward causation. Let’s recall his argument that, as we discussed, identifies the 
supervenience and the emergence bases. Let be M and M* two emerging properties, and 
suppose that M causes M* (a case of ‘same-level’ causation). As an emergent property, M* 
has an emergence base, say P*. Given the supervenience relation, P* is necessary and 
sufficient for M*: if P* is present at a given time, then M* is also present. Accordingly, it is 
unclear in what sense M could play a causal role in bringing about M*: given P*, its role 
would be useless, unless M has in fact something to do in causing P*. In other words, the 
same-level causation of an emergent property makes sense only if this implies the causation 
of the “appropriate basal conditions from which it will emerge” (Kim, 2006, p. 558). As a 
consequence, causation produced by emergent properties seems to imply, in all cases, 
downward causation in the sense of a causal influence exerted by an emergent property on the 
basal conditions of another emergent property.  
, since the 
very concept of emergence carries on the issue of the relations between properties at different 
levels.  
Yet, as Kim himself has argued (Kim, 2010), this general form of downward causation, i.e. a 
causal influence exerted by an entity at a higher-level on a distinct entity located at a lower 
level, is indeed widespread and unproblematic. In particular, this interpretation of downward 
causation applies straightforwardly to self-maintenance and closure, which inherently involve, 
as discussed, the upward and downward causation between constraints and dynamics, each of 
them located at different levels of description (see also section 7.2 below).  
The more controversial form of downward causation would be that exerted by a whole on its 
own constituents (in Kim’s terms, “reflexive” downward causation, 2010, p. 33). According 
to Emmeche et al. (2000), there are various possible interpretations of reflexive upward and 
downward causation. In their view, the only non-contradictory versions of the concept are 
those interpreting downward causation in terms of ‘formal’ causation (2000, pp. 31-32), such 
that the whole exerts a constraining action on its own constituents, by selecting specific 
behaviours among a set of possible ones. This interpretation can be taken, as Emmeche and 
 
19 According to Lloyd Morgan, “[...] when some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), 
the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence-
different from what it would have been if life had been absent. [...]. I shall say that this new manner in which 
lower events happen - this touch of novelty in evolutionary advance depends on the new kind of relatedness” 
(Lloyd Morgan, 1923, p. 16). According to Stephan (1992) Lloyd Morgan’s passage could admit different 
interpretations, such as that of a logical claim about supervenience. On the contrary, McLaughlin asserts: “In 
Morgan one finds the notion of downward causation clearly and forcefully articulated” (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 
68). 
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co-authors claim, as the standard and possibly more compelling one of downward causation, 
and it is very close to the original proposal by Campbell (1974)20
As an illustration, consider Sperry’s classical example of the wheel rolling downhill (Sperry, 
1969). On the one side, the various molecules generate the wheel as a whole. On the other 
side, as Emmeche et al. (2000, p. 24) explain, “none of the single molecules constituting the 
wheel or gravity’s pull on them are sufficient to explain the rolling movement. To explain this 
one must recur to the higher level at which the form of the wheel becomes conceivable”. The 
set of configurational properties of molecules is supposed here to underdetermine their 
behaviour so that, in order to explain it, one needs to appeal to a property of the whole (in this 
case: the form of the wheel) that would generate a causal influence (a selective constraint) 
exerted on its own constituents.  
.  
Because of the (supposed) under-determination of constituents by configurational (intrinsic 
and relational) properties, constituents’ behaviour is partly determined, in a functionally 
irreducible way, by the whole to which they belong. In particular, this train of thought seems 
to equally apply to biological systems, in which the behaviour and dynamics of the parts 
appears to be, in an important sense, determined (notably through regulation and control 
functions) by the downward causation exerted by the whole system to which they belong.  
In what follows, we will examine whether self-maintenance and closure do involve some 
form of reflexive inter-level causation, intended as a particular form of constraint exerted by 
the whole on its parts. As we will argue (7.1), there seems to be no compelling argument in 
favour of a positive answer in our framework, at least under the monistic assumptions adopted 
so far. Alternative conclusions could be obtained (7.2) by rejecting some of these 
assumptions, or by shifting the analysis to an epistemological or heuristic dimension.    
Before continuing, a terminological clarification. A possible objection might contend that this 
debate somehow forces a narrow understanding of inter-level causation in terms of reflexive 
whole-parts causal influence, whereas the usual meaning in the biological domain refers to the 
non-reflexive case, where higher-level entities interact with lower-level entities, the latter not 
being constituents of the former. Indeed, this interpretation of inter-level causation applies 
straightforwardly to biological organisation, and is inherently involved in the very notion of 
closure. In this sense, biological discourse requires a general concept of inter-level causation. 
To avoid ambiguities, we propose using different terms to refer to the two ideas: in what 
follows “inter-level causation” will be therefore used for the general non-reflexive case, and 
“nested causation” for the reflexive whole-parts case.  
This way, biological descriptions would be able to refer to inter-level causation, while at the 
same time avoiding incongruities with philosophical analyses. 
7.1 Why we do not need nested inter-level causation in biology 
The account of emergence and supervenience developed so far has relevant implications on 
the conception of nested causation21
 
20 Campbell defines downward causation as follows: “all processes at the lower level of a hierarchy are 
restrained by and act in conformity to the laws of the higher level” (1974, p. 180). 
.  
21 In the philosophical literature, nested causation comes in two variants, synchronic and diachronic (Kim, 2010, 
pp. 34-36). On the one hand, synchronic nested causation refers to the situation in which upward and downward 
causation would occur simultaneously. In more technical terms, a supervenient property M acts causally on its 
supervenience base S1…Sn at the same time that the supervenience base generates M. On the other hand, 
diachronic (or diagonal) nested causation refers to the situation in which M acts on its own supervenience base 
S1,…Sn, causing its modification, but only at a subsequent time with respect to the upward determination. In this 
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Concerning the supervenience base B – insofar as the principle of inclusivity of levels is 
maintained (but see section 7.2 below), and the relation between an emergent property M and 
the configurational properties S1,…Sn of B is conceived as constitutive – the exclusion 
argument applies more cogently to relational supervenience than to its atomistic version. As a 
consequence, as Craver and Bechtel (2007) emphasise, no nested causation can exist between 
an emergent property and its own supervenience base: there is no justification for claiming 
either that S1,…Sn ‘generate’ or ‘produce’ M, or that M exerts downward causation on S1,…Sn. 
In particular, the closed organisation does not exert causation on the whole network of 
constitutive constraints, and the whole network of constitutive constraints does not produce 
the closed organisation. Under the monistic stance adopted so far, there is therefore no room 
for nested causation. 
Let us consider now the emergence base P of C, and its different versions discussed in section 
4. Is there nested causation between the configuration C and any subset Psset of its 
constituents? In our view, by assuming the principle of the inclusivity of levels, the answer is 
no, since the properties of each Psset (which may refer, for instance, to each individual 
constraint) are by definition configurational, so that the appeal to some constraint exerted by 
the whole would be redundant: configurational properties are such precisely because an entity 
belongs to a whole. Also, no nested causation occurs between the whole and its substrate Psstr 
because, in our account, the collection of its constituents taken separately (without their 
configurational properties) is an abstract description that does not correspond to the way in 
which constituents are organised in the system. Since, in the system there is no such a thing as 
the collection of unrelated constituents, they cannot, a fortiori, be involved in nested 
causation, or indeed any causation at all.  
The case of the third kind of emergence base, the surroundings Psurr, is somehow different. As 
we discussed in sections 5 and 6, emergent configurations do exert a causal action on their 
surroundings, notably in the form of constraints. Yet, surroundings are by definition external 
to the configuration, which means that the constraints exerted by C on Psurr can by no means 
be interpreted in terms of nested causation.  
The claim according to which constraints, in our framework, do exert causal powers, but not 
in the form of nested causation, has crucial consequences on the interpretation of self-
maintenance and closure.  
In the case of physical self-maintaining systems, the fact that the emergent configuration acts 
to maintain itself does not appear to constitute, per se, a case of nested causation, since the 
constraining action is exerted on the surroundings of the configuration, not on its own 
constituents. Let us consider again the example of Bénard cells. An interpretation appealing to 
nested causation would claim that each cell (i.e. the emergent configuration) exerts a 
constraint on its own microscopic constituents, in the sense that the fact of belonging to a 
given cell determines whether a molecule rotates in a clockwise or counter-clockwise 
direction. As Juarrero (2009, p. 85) puts this: “Once each water molecule is captured in the 
dynamics of a rolling hexagonal Bénard cell it is no longer related to the other molecules just 
externally; its behaviour is contextually constrained by the global structure which it 
constitutes and into which it is caught up. That is, its behaviour is what it is in virtue of the 
individual water molecules’ participation in a global structure”. 
Yet, what we call the cell is the configuration of constituents, so that, as we argued above, it 
is redundant to appeal to the whole set of constituents and relations to explain the behaviour 
                                                                                                                                                        
paper, however, we assume that the distinction is irrelevant, since we question the very idea of the causal 
influence of M on S1,…Sn, be it synchronic or diachronic.  
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of each constituent, whose characterisation already includes its relational properties as part of 
the configuration. Once a given molecule has been ‘captured’ by the cell and has begun to 
rotate with the others, in what sense would it still be “constrained by the global structure”22
Two reasons may explain why self-maintaining systems seem to be a case of nested 
causation. First, the description of the configurational properties of dissipative structures, 
which is available at a given moment, usually under-determines their behaviour. This is of 
course a crucial point; still, as we discussed earlier, this should not be taken as a sufficient 
reason to appeal to nested causal relations since, as we pointed out in section 3, it confuses 
epistemological non-derivability with ontological irreducibility (but see section 7.2. below). 
Second, self-maintaining systems would not exist if they did not generate a causal loop 
between the whole configuration and its constituents. Yet, the crucial point is that, in our 
view, this loop is not a direct loop, but rather an indirect one, realised through the action of 
the constraint on its surroundings. What might appear as an action exerted on the constituents 
is in fact exerted on the boundary conditions of these constituents.  
?  
In the light of these considerations, in particular, we do not think that the appeal to the 
supposed constraint exerted by the configuration on its own constituents in terms of formal 
causation is explanatory (again, under the monist assumptions adopted so far). The formal 
causation of the whole on its constituents would be in principle reducible to the constraining 
action exerted on the boundary conditions of these constituents, without loss of information or 
explanatory power. 
Let us now examine closure. Is there a characteristic aspect of closure that would justify, in 
contrast to simple self-maintenance, the claim according to which it realises nested causation?  
The main difference between physical self-maintenance and closure is that, in the second 
case, self-maintenance is realised collectively, by a network of mutually dependent 
constraints. In real biological systems, closure is realised though a very complex organisation 
of constraints, such that, in most cases, a given constraint exerts its action on surroundings 
that have already been subject to the causal influence of at least one other constraint. For 
instance, most enzymes act on reactions whose reactants are the result of the joint action of 
other constraints, including the membrane (through its channels and pumps). In these cases, it 
can be said that constraints act on entities which are already ‘within’ the system, at least in the 
sense of having already been constrained by the system. This seems to be a clear difference 
with respect to simple self-maintaining systems, and one may then conclude that the closed 
organisation does act on its own constituents, and realises nested causation.  
Yet, we hold that the conclusion is incorrect, since it interprets those constrained processes 
and reactions as constituents of the organisation (which, we recall, is a higher-level 
configuration of constraints), whereas they are not. In biological systems, the constituents of 
the organisation are the constraints themselves, which realise collective self-maintenance. 
Under the constitutive interpretation of the relation between the whole and its constituents, 
the organisation as such does not possess emergent and distinctive causal powers with respect 
to the network of constraints which, in turn, exerts causal powers on surroundings which are 
not themselves constituents of the network (although they usually are within the spatial 
 
22 A satisfactory analysis of downward causation, then, requires a careful distinction between two ideas. One is 
the idea that a configuration is made up by a set of constituents, which have causal interactions between them. 
Explaining why a given molecule of water is rotating in a given manner at a given moment requires an appeal to 
its causal interactions with other constituents. And the reason why a set of constituents may exert a causal 
influence on other constituents is, of course, that all of them belong to the same system. The other idea, in 
contrast, is that the ‘whole system’, including any specific constituent, would have a causal role on that very 
constituent. 
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borders of the system)23
A second reason why closure seems to inherently imply nested causation is that evoked by 
Kant (Kant, [1781] 1987), i.e. the fact that the existence of the constituents (the constraints) 
‘depends on the whole’. Indeed, the mutual dependence among constraints is a fundamental 
difference between organisations and other configurations. In the second case the existence 
and maintenance of the constituents does not depend on their being involved in the 
configuration: one can decompose a wheel into its molecular elements, which would continue 
to exist as separate elements. The same holds for the microscopic constituents of a dissipative 
system. In contrast, closed organisations imply a more ‘existential’ kind of relation among 
constituents (the constraints themselves), which exist as far as they are involved in the whole 
organisation. Actually, the appeal to formal causation advocated by several authors is 
essentially aimed, in our view, at capturing this distinctive feature of biological organisms. 
. Accordingly, we maintain that closure does involve inter-level 
causation, but not nested causation.  
Yet, these specific features of closed organisations do not require ascribing distinctive causal 
powers to the whole, since closure can be realised through the network of mutual, usually 
hierarchical, causal interactions. ‘Depending on the whole’, therefore, could simply mean 
‘depending on the whole network of interactions’ without appealing to the whole as causal 
agent emergent on its own supervenience base. This interpretation of the whole-parts relation 
in biological organisation is particularly relevant because it applies to all those cases in which 
biological literature typically appeals to nested causation, i.e. all kinds of regulation and 
control mechanisms, - very common in biological systems - thanks to which organisms are 
able to (adaptively) compensate for internal and/or external perturbations (Piaget, 1967; Fell, 
1997). What is frequently described as a causal action of the whole system on its own 
constituents, is in fact the result of the interaction among hierarchically organised constraints 
(or subsystems of constraints) which can result, for instance, in the acceleration of the heart 
rate and glucose metabolism when the organism starts playing tennis (see Craver and Bechtel, 
2007, p. 559, for a detailed description of this example, and other relevant ones). Regulation 
and control can be understood in terms of (non-nested) inter-level causal interactions among 
constraints: although they inherently require, as all biological functions do, the realisation of 
closure as an emergent causal regime (see section 6 above), they do not involve nested 
causation exerted by the whole organism.  
7.2 Why we might need, after all, nested causation in biology 
The rejection of nested causation depends on the constitutive interpretation of the 
supervenience relation adopted so far. Indeed, the central goal of the analysis was to suggest 
that closure can be justifiably taken as an emergent and distinctively biological regime of 
causation even under a constitutive interpretation of supervenience. Yet, several strategies 
could be adopted to justify nested causation, and they might be successful and operational in 
some cases, including the biological domain, which is specifically under study here. To date, 
however, we think that these strategies lack any compelling argument in favour of their 
adoption in the biological domain; their relevance is still under conceptual and scientific 
scrutiny. That is why, in our view, the constitutive interpretation of the whole-parts relation is 
still the wiser one. Let us discuss these strategies.  
 
23 The physical processes on which the network exerts (constraining) causal powers can, in some cases, become 
members of the network itself, when they enter into configurations which act as constraints. Nonetheless, the 
network would exert causal powers on them as long as they are part of its surroundings, and it would cease 
acting causally on them as soon as they would start playing the role of constraints. 
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The first strategy is ontological and advocates that a non-constitutive interpretation of 
relational supervenience should be adopted, in order to admit causation of the whole on the 
constituents. In this interpretation, emergent properties can be at the same time supervenient 
on and irreducible to configurations. For this ontological stance to be coherent, one must 
accept the violation of the inclusivity of levels, hence accepting the idea that the very same 
entity (say: a constituent of a configuration) may possess different properties, and therefore 
obey different laws or principles, at different levels of description. In other terms, it consists 
in rejecting the monistic stance advocated so far. For instance, each molecule constituting the 
wheel would have the property of behaving in a given way when considering the whole 
configuration, but each of them would not possess the same property when looked at 
individually. Even though we are looking at the very same molecules under the very same 
conditions, their properties would vary according to the level of description, since the relevant 
laws and principle would vary.  
In our view, rejecting the principle of the inclusivity of levels could be indeed an important 
tool to adequately account for natural phenomena that would require appealing to nested 
causation. We have no principled objections to this position. Yet, we maintain that its 
relevance for the biological domain is still uncertain. As Craver & Bechtel (2007) have 
convincingly argued, many (or most) apparent biological examples of downward causation (in 
particular cases of ‘downward’ regulation) seem to be adequately explainable by hybrid 
accounts appealing to intra-level causal interactions between constituents and inter-level 
constitutive relations. In those cases, an advocate of the constitutive interpretation of 
mereological supervenience could argue that the appeal to nested causation seems precisely to 
stem from an inadequate understanding of the role of configurations: the behaviour of the 
constituents appears to be influenced by the whole because the description focuses only on the 
internal properties of the constituents, neglecting the relational ones24
The second strategy is epistemological, and consists in justifying nested causation by 
demonstrating that it would be impossible, in principle, to determine the behaviour of a 
system through a description of its configurational properties. On the basis of such negative 
result, the appeal to nested causation would be justified in epistemological terms, since there 
would be, in principle, no alternative description
. In a word, there seems 
to be no clear case in the biological domain for which the appeal to nested causation is 
mandatory. Self-maintenance and closure are no exceptions in this respect.  
25
 
24 In the case of the wheel, for instance, one may say that if we describe a given molecule as a constituent of a 
wheel, we are already including in the description all constitutive and relational properties, which make it a 
constituent (‘being in such and such position’, ‘having such and such interactions and links with neighbouring 
molecules’…), and which determine its behaviour under specific conditions. For instance, a force (i.e. gravity) 
applied to a part will generate a chain of causal interactions among the constituents which, because of their 
individual configurational properties, will behave in a specific way. We will then call the collective pattern the 
‘rolling movement of the wheel’. Each molecule of the wheel will move in a specific way because its 
configurational properties force it to do so, and a complete description of the configurational properties of the 
individual constituent will suffice to explain why it behaves as it does. The fact that the constituents collectively 
constitute a wheel, whose macroscopic behaviour can be described as a rolling movement, does not add anything 
to the explanation of the individual behaviour. There are indeed causal interactions here, but not inter-level 
causation.  
. Yet, while arguments of ‘inaccessibility’ 
have already been formulated in physics (Silberstein & McGeever, 1999), this is not the case 
25 See Bich (2012) for an epistemological discussion of the relationship between emergence and downward 
causation. 
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in biology 26
The third strategy is heuristic. There are in fact many cases, especially in complex systems, in 
which the available description of the configurational properties is insufficient to adequately 
determine the behaviour of the whole system. In those cases, which are indeed widespread, it 
might be useful to appeal to the configuration as a whole as if, by virtue of its emergent 
properties, it were exerting nested causation on its constituents, so to provide a description 
capable of sufficiently determining the behaviour of the system. Since it is not committed to a 
theoretical non-constitutive interpretation of supervenience, the heuristic appeal to nested 
causation can be adopted as a pragmatic tool even within a constitutive interpretation of 
supervenience. Yet, such a heuristic use of nested causation would not point to specific 
features of the causal regime at work in biology (which is the object of this paper), but it 
would simply correspond to a scientific practice common to several scientific domains. In 
particular, as we mentioned above, the strategy can be adopted for self-maintaining and 
closed systems for which, mostly because of their internal complexity, complete descriptions 
of their organisation are difficult to elaborate.  
. As a consequence, there seems to be, to date, no compelling epistemological 
arguments imposing to admit nested causation for biological systems. 
8 Conclusions 
The main claim of this paper is that the organisation of biological systems can be shown to 
realise a distinctive causal regime, that we labelled closure. Closure translates into 
contemporary terms the original Kantian idea, according to which living systems can be 
conceived as natural purposes, in which each part exists with respect to the other parts, such 
that the whole is able to self-maintain. In order for closure to be a legitimate scientific concept 
– and not just an epistemic shortcut – philosophical arguments must be provided in favour of 
its emergent and irreducible character with respect to the causal regimes at work in other 
classes of natural systems. To attain this objective, we developed a twofold argument.  
On the one hand, we argued that closure is to be conceived as the mutual dependence among a 
set of constituents, each of them acting as a constraint. Constraints are configurations which, 
by virtue of the relations among their own constituents, possess emergent properties enabling 
them to exert distinctive causal powers on their surroundings, and specifically on 
thermodynamic processes and reactions. When a set of constraints realises closure, the 
resulting organisation constitutes a higher-level emergent regime of causation, possessing 
irreducible properties and causal powers. In particular, closed organisations are able to self-
maintain as a whole (whereas none of the constitutive constraints can do it) which, in turn, 
enables them to generate biological functions.  
On the other hand, we advocated the idea that a coherent defence of closure as an emergent 
and irreducible causal regime does not need to invoke nested causation. Closed organisations 
can be understood in terms of causal interactions among mutually dependent (sets of) 
constraints, without implying upward or downward causal actions between the whole and the 
parts. Biological emergence, accordingly, is logically distinct from nested causation, and one 
can advocate the former without being committed with the latter. 
Again we by no means want to exclude the possibility that biological organisation might 
involve nested causation. As we discussed, various strategies could be adopted to adequately 
 
26 It should be noted, however, that the issue is currently being explored by several biologists and theoreticians. 
For instance, a relevant proposal in this direction has recently been developed by Soto, Sonnenschein and 
Miquel (Soto et al., 2008).  
 21 
justify this idea, and promising explorations are currently underway. Nevertheless, we believe 
that these attempts are, as yet, incomplete, and do not offer compelling arguments in the 
biological domain. That is why we argued that biological organisation can be shown to be 
emergent and irreducible even though nested causation is, by hypothesis, ruled out.   
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